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THE TAXPAYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVILEGES IN INCOME TAX
INVESTIGATIONS*
ALBERT J. GOULD, of the Denver Bar

I shall discuss some of the constitutional privileges which the
individual taxpayer enjoys under the terms of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The
Fourth Amendment, of course, pertains to unlawful search and
seizure of the records and property of the individual taxpayer, and
the Fifth Amendment pertains to the right of the individual taxpayer to refuse to give testimony against himself.
We shall not be concerned today with those phases of the
Fifth Amendment about which we have heard, read, and seen so
much within recent months. Instead of criticizing citizens for
invoking the Fifth Amendment, we shall endeavor to ascertain
when and under what circumstances an individual properly and
lawfully may invoke the privileges reserved by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.
The important constitutional privileges of the individual taxpayer which I shall discuss may be summarized by stating that
he shall not be compelled to give or furnish evidence against himself. The evidence which he might disclose to a revenue agent in
an income tax investigation falls into two classes-namely, his
oral evidence and his written evidence, or his oral statements and
his written statements in the form of his records of his receipts
and expenditures.
What, then, are the constitutional privileges of the individual
taxpayer against being compelled by his government to supply
evidence against himself by his spoken word or by his written
word, and is there or should there be any distinction between the
two? Even today no one seems to question the right of an individual taxpayer to refuse to make sworn or unsworn oral statements which will tend to incriminate him unless he has waived
his immunity privilege. During the last few years, however, a
serious question has arisen as to whether an individual taxpayer
may withhold or refuse to submit to a revenue agent his written
words-that is, his books and records in which he has recorded
his receipts and expenditures for the purpose of computing his
income tax, exen though said books and records may tend to incriminate him.
An early leading case on this point is U. S. v. Sullivan decided by the District Court of the Western District of New York
in 1923, 287 F. 138, in which the Court definitely and clearly held
that the books and records of Sullivan, an individual taxpayer,
were private records and were not subject to subpoena for the
above purposes.
* An address delivered July 13, 1954 at the annual. conference of the Tenth
Judicial Circuit at Estes Park, Colorado.
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In the Sullivan case, the United States petitioned the Court
to request Sullivan to produce all records, books, papers, accounts,
and other documentary evidence pertaining to his own income and
that of his corporation and partnership for examination and audit
to determine income tax liability. Sullivan resisted on the ground
that such an examination would disclose facts which might be
used against him in a criminal case therif pending in another United
States court for conspiracy to defraud the United States in transactions pertaining to the purchase of lumber for the government
and subsequent sales thereof. You will note that he feared use of
the evidence in another federal case then pending which did not
involve a violation of the revenue laws.
The Court overruled Sullivan as to the corporate records, but
in sustaining Sullivan's position as to his personal and partnership
records said:
At the outset in may be stated that the law is well
settled that the constitutional provision against compelling a person to be a witness against himself of self incrimination applies with equal force to oral testimony
and to the production and examination of one's books and
papers.
In view of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he
cannot be compelled to submit his books for examination, and by such means be required to give testimony
which will put him in jeopardy of his liberty unless complete immunity is afforded. Upon this phase the statute
is silent.
The Sullivan case merely restates a proposition established
by the United States Supreme Court in 1886 in another leading
case of Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, in which it was held that:
The seizure or compulsory production of a man's
private papers to be used in evidence against him is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself,
and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty, or forfeiture,
is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
The above precedents illustrate the reason for Attorney General Brownell's recent request to Congress to enact a statute granting immunity to communist witnesses; because if they cannot be
prosecuted after testifying, their constitutional privileges cannot
be invoked and they can be compelled to testify. As stated in the
Sullivan case, a statute granting immunity to witnesses in income
tax investigations was repealed in 1910 and a similar statute has
not been reenacted.
No substantial doubt was cast upon 'the doctrine of the
Sullivan and Boyd cases that the constitutional privileges of an
individual taxpayer apply as fully to his written word as to his
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spoken word until June 21, 1948 when the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Shapiro v. U. S., 335 U. S. 1. This is the
well-known O.P.A. fruit and produce case.
Section 202 of the O.P.A. statute approved during the Second
World War to control or regulate prices, provided that the O.P.A.
Administrator was authorized by regulation or order to require
any person subject to the Act "to make and keep records and other
documents and to make reports ....
to permit the inspection and
copying of records and other documents (and to permit) the inspection of inventories . . . " For the purpose of obtaining information, the Administrator was authorized to require by subpoena any person subject to the Act to appear and testify or appear
and produce documents or both.
Pursuant to the statute, the Administrator served Shapiro
with a subpoena to bring records and testify. Shapiro complied
with the subpoena and at the hearing his counsel inquired whether
he was being granted immunity. The presiding official stated,
"The witness is entitled to whatever immunity shall flow as a
matter of law from the production of these books and records
which are required to be kept." Shapiro thereupon produced the
records but expressly claimed his constitutional privilege.
In spite of the foregoing he was indicted, and in holding
Shapiro subject to indictment the five to four majority opinion
of the United States Supreme Court reads in part as follows:
• . .the language of the statute and its legislative history viewed against the background of settled judicial
construction of the immunity provision, indicate that
Congress required records to be kept as a means of enforcing the statute and did not intend to frustrate the
use of those records for enforcement action by granting
an immunity bonus to individuals compelled to disclose
their required records to the Administrator.
The Court made the above statement in spite of a specific
immunity provision in the statute included for the protection of
an individual in this exact situation and intended to permit the
Administrator to force an individuaJ to furnish evidence upon the
same basis as the proposed compulsory testimony statute before
Congress at this time.
Although the Shapiro majority opinion, construed as the dissenters construed it, would overrule the Sullivan and Boyd cases,
no mention of those cases is made in said opinion. The majority
opinion is based upon, and the gist of the opinion is contained in
a quotation of a part of a paragraph from the opinion in the leading case of Wilson v. U.. S., 221 U. S. 361 (1911), to which. I shall
refer later.
Two -vigorous dissentiig opinions construe the opinion to subject all- books and records kept. pursuant to any federal statute,
inclRding books and records of an individual taxpayer, to be sub-
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ject to subpoena in spite of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion said in part:
The underlying assumption of the Court's opinion
is that all records which Congress in the exercise of its
constitutional powers may require individuals to keep in
the conduct of their affairs, because those affairs also
have aspects of public interest, become "public" records
in the sense that they fall outside the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. The validity of such a
doctrine lies in the scope of its implications. The claim
touches records that may be required to be kept by federal regulatory laws, revenue measures, labor and census
legislation in the conduct of business which the understanding and feeling of our people still treat as private
enterprise, even though its relations to the public may call
for governmental regulation, including the duty to keep
designated records ... If Congress by the easy device of
requiring a man to keep the private papers that he has
customarily kept can render such papers "public" and
nonprivileged, there is little left to either the right of
privacy or the constitutional privilege. (Emphasis supplied.)
Justices Jackson, Murphy and Rutledge also dissented, and
Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion said in part:
Today's decision introduces a principle of considerable moment. Of course, it strips of protection only business men and their records; but we cannot too often remind ourselves of the tendency of such a principle, once
approved, to expand itself in practice "to the limits of
its logic".
We should not attribute to Congress such a purpose
or intent unless it used language so mandatory and unmistakable that it left no alternative. ...
The Shapiro majority opinion applies to all records of individual taxpayers, or it applies only to records of an individual
taxpayer engaged in a business affected with a public interest.
If we construe the Shapiro majority opinion to apply only to business affected with a public interest, we then have the following
situation. There are two types of transactions which result in
the filing of income tax returns by individuals; that is, ordinary
business carried on by an individual taxpayer which is not subject to governmental regulation within the meaning of the Shapiro
case, and business affected with a public interest which is subject
to governmental regulation because it is subject to regulation
under the police power. If the majority opinion in the Shapiro
case applies only to business which is subject to regulation under
the police power, then it follows that individuals engaged in busi-
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ness transactions not subject to the police power would enjoy all
immunity privileges as to their books and records, and those engaged in business subject to the police power would have no immunity privilege as to their books and records.
If we, like Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Murphy and Rutlege, construe the Shapiro case to apply to all books and records
kept pursuant to any federal statute by an individual business
man, we must acknowledge that the Shapiro majority opinion has
taken from the individual taxpayer an immunity privilege "founded
in 150 years of precedent" in the words of Mr. Justice Black in
Rogers v. U. S., 340 U. S. 367.
At this point let us review the constitutional and legal provisions which require the keeping of books and records by an individual taxpayer, in order to compare them with the statute and
regulations involved in the Shapiro case.
The Sixteenth Amendment grants Congress "power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states and without regard
to any census or enumeration"; the Internal Revenue Code, requires_ every person liable to pay income taxes to "keep such records ... and comply with such rules and regulations as the commissioner ... may from time to time require"; and the regulations
require a taxpayer, among other things, to "maintain such accounting records as will enable him" to make a return of his true
income.
Section 3614 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the commissioner, by any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue
Service to examine books, papers, records, and memoranda of an
individual taxpayer; and Section 3615 of the Internal Revenue
Code authorizes the collector to summon an individual taxpayer
for examination of his books and to apply to the Judge of the
United States District Court for a contempt order for the taxpayer's failure to produce his books in response to such summons.
The authority of Congress to enact the Internal Revenue Code is
derived from a constitutional Amendment equal in authority to
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
If the majority opinion in the Shapiro case is to stand, it is
not difficult to construe it to apply to the books and records of an
individual taxpayer; and as a matter of fact, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Falsone v. U. S., 205 F.
(2d) 734, (6-26-53), followed that line and held that the Internal
Revenue Code requires the taxpayer to submit his books and records for examination without any immunity privilege and stated:
Statutes granting such authority have been held constitutional as against the contention that they provide
for unreasonable searches and seizures and compel the
taxpayer to be a witness against himself.
and cited the Shapiro case as- authority..
Professor Bernard D. Meltzer of the University of Chicago
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Law School, in an article in the University of Chicago Law Review,
Vol. 18, No. 4, stated that in his opinion there is no distinction
between "regulated records" referred to in the Shapiro case and
"required or revenue records" referred to in the Internal Revenue
Code. Other text writers have taken a contrary view.
Because the Shapiro majority opinion is of such vital importance and because it is grounded on the Wilson case, I now proceed to an analysis of that case, advising you in advance that I
do not believe the doctrine of the Wilson case justified the majority opinion in the Shapiro case because, as you will see, the Wilson
case is authority only for the proposition that books of a corporation are not privileged in the hands of its president even though
they include documents prepared by said president which would
tend to incriminate him personally.
In order that each of you may construe the Wilson opinion
instead of relying upon my summary, I quote from the Wilson
opinion as follows:
The contempt consisted in the refusal of the plaintiff
in error and appellant, Christopher C. Wilson, to permit
the inspection by a grand jury of the letter press copy
books in his possession. The books belonged to a corporation of which he was president and were required
to be produced by a subpoena duces tecum. (Page 367.)
The appellant asserts his privilege against selfcrimination. There is no question, of course, of oral testimony, for he was not required to give any. Undoubtedly
it also protected him against the compulsory production
of his private books and papers. Boyd v. U. S., supra;
Bollman v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 195. But did it extend to
the corporate books?
For there can be no question of the character of the
books here called for. They were described in the subpoena as the books of the corporation and it was the books
so defined which, admitting possession, he withheld. The
copies of letters written by the president of the corporation in the course of its transactions were as much a part
of its documentary property, subject to its control and to
its duty to produce when lawfully required in judicial
proceedings, as its ledgers and minute books. (Page 377.)
But his personal letters were not demanded; these
the subpoena did not seek to reach; and as to these no
question of violation of privilege is presented. . . . But
the appellant was not content with protection. against the
production of his private letters; he claimed the privilege
to withhold the corporate books and the documents which
related to corporate matters and With resp-ect to which
he had acted in his capacity as the executive officer of
the corporation. And that is the right here asserted.
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It is at once apparent that the mere fact that the
appellant himself wrote, or signed, the official letters
copied into the books, neither conditioned nor enlarged
his privilege. (Page 378.) . . .
We come then to the broader contention of the appellant-thus stated in the argument of his counsel: "An
officer of a corporation who actually holds the physical
possession, custody and control of books or papers of
the corporation which he is required by a subpoena duces
tecum to produce, is entitled to the same protection against
exposing the contents thereof which would tend to incriminate him, as if the books and papers were absolutely
his own." That is, the power of the courts to require
their production depends not upon their character as corporate books and the duty of the corporation to submit
them to examination, but upon the particular custody in
which they may be found. If they are in the actual
custody of an officer whose criminal conduct they would
disclose, then, as this argument would have it, his possession must be deemed inviolable, and, maintaining the
absolute control which alone will insure protection from
their being used against him in a criminal proceeding,
he may defy the authority of the corporation whose officer or fiduciary he is and assert against the visitatorial
power of the State, and the authority of the Government
enforcing its laws, an impassable barrier. (Page 379.)
Then follows the paragraph, a part of which was quoted in
the Shapiro majority opinion, which I now quote in full:
But the physical custody of incriminating documents
(in this case corporate records prepared for the corporation by its president which would tend to incriminate
him) does not of itself protect the custodian against their
compulsory production. The question still remains with
respect to the nature of the document and the capacity
in which they are held. It may yet appear that they are
of a character which subjects them to the scrutiny demanded and that the custodian has voluntarily assumed
a duty which overrides his claim of privilege. This was
clearly implied in the Boyd case where the fact that the
papers involved were the private papers of the claimant
was constantly emphasized. Thus in the case of public
records and official documents, made or kept in the administration of public office, the fact of actual possession
or of lawful custody would not justify the officer in resisting inspection, even though the record was made by
himself and would supply the evidence of his criminal
dereliction. If he has embezzled the public moneys and
falsified the public accounts he cannot seal his official
records and withhold them from the prosecuting authori-
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ties on a plea of constitutional privilege against selfcrimination. The principle applies not only to public
documents in public offices, but also to records required
by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate
subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement
of restrictions validly established. There the privilege,
which exists as to private papers, cannot be maintained.
(Page 380.) (Emphasis supplied.)
The reference in the above paragraph to the "Boyd case" and
"private papers" would seem to indicate that the Wilson case was
not intended to abrogate any constitutional privilege.
An immunity privilege is limited to the individual, of course,
because the founding fathers decided that we should have a government of laws and not of men. A corporation not being an
individual, but being a "creature of the state" enjoys no such
immunity, and the Wilson case held no more than that an individual who is an officer of a corporation may not withhold corporate records merely because he has possession of them and prepared them, even though they tend to incriminate him personally.
From the foregoing I conclude that the doctrine of the Wilson
case is limited strictly to corporate records and is no authority
whatsoever for the holding in the Shapiro case denying the immunity privilege to an individual as to his personal books and
records.
In short, the dissenting opinions in the Shapiro case seem to
be sound law, and the Supreme Court of the United States certainly will be requested to, and should overrule the Shapiro majority opinion, because there seems to be no way to distinguish
it or support its abrogation of an important constitutional privilege recognized by all from the foundation of the Republic to
June 21, 1948.
Assuming, for the purpose of the remainder of this discussion, that in some manner the Shapiro case ultimately will not
deprive the individual taxpayer of his immunity privileges as to
his books and records, our next inquiry naturally is: how may
an individual taxpayer waive his privilege not to produce his books
and records, and his privilege not to make oral statements because all constitutional privileges may be waived by the individual
taxpayer?
At the risk of stating elemental principles, I should like
to review a few essential elements of the doctrine of waiver which
have been established by judicial precedent in civil as well as
criminal cases, and which must be followed if the immunity privileges of taxpayers are to be preserved.
A waiver involves the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.
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A strong presumption is raised against a waiver of
fundamental rights by an accused.
The constitutional rights of an accused are jealously
and vigilantly guarded.
The mere silence of an accused or his failure to object or to protest .. .does not waive immunity.
Consent to waive immunity must be entirely voluntary and not induced by misrepresentation, fraud, trickery, promises or threats.-Go-Bart Importing Company
v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344.
In Johnson v. U. S., 333 U. S. 10 (1948), the Supreme
Court said, "A waiver of constitutional right should be
inferred only where it is evidenced by an intelligent affirmative act."
A very important rule is laid down in Amos v. U. S.,
255 U. S. 313, and Johnson v. U. S., cited above, .
mere acquiescence in a search reasonably attributable to
a regard for the authority of the law is not a waiver."
Rogers v. U. S., 340 U. S. 367, which went up from this Circuit in 1951, was a case involving the exercise of immunity privileges by an alleged communist, and Mr. Justice Black, with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas concurring, had this
to say in a dissenting opinion:
Some people are hostile to the Fifth Amendment's
provision unequivocally commanding that no United
States official shall compel a person to be a witness against
himself. They consider the provision as an outmoded
relic of past years, generated by ancient inquisitorial
practices that could not possibly happen here. For this
reason the privilege to be silent is sometimes accepted
as being more or less of a constitutional nuisance which
the courts should abate whenever and however possible.
Such an end could be achieved by two obvious judicial
techniques: (1) narrow construction of the scope of the
privilege; (2) broad construction of the doctrine of
"waiver." Any attempt to use the first of these methods,
however, runs afoul of approximately 150 years of precedent. This court has almost always construed the Amendment broadly on the view that compelling a person to
convict himself of crime is "contrary to the principles
of a free government" and "abhorrent to the instinct of
an American"; that while such coercive practice "may
suit the purposes of despotic power . . .it cannot abide
the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal
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freedom." Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 632; but cf.
U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141.
The doctrine of waiver seems to be a more palatable
but equally effective device for whittling away the protection afforded by the privilege, but we have said that
intention to waive the privilege" against self-incrimination is not "lightly to be inferred" and that vague and
uncertain evidence will not support a finding of waiver.
No problem arises when an individual taxpayer expressly
waives an immunity privilege by voluntarily consenting to an
examination with knowledge that a fraud investigation is in progress. A problem arises, however, when a taxpayer contends that
he did not intend to waive an immunity privilege.
The issue arises in several types of income tax investigations.
The first type is the ordinary routine investigation wherein a
revenue agent, with no suspicion of fraud, obtains possession of
the individual taxpayer's books and records and secures statements from him voluntarily and without misrepresentation, fraud,
promise, threat, or stealth, and then finds evidence of fraud which
enables the government to use said records and statements as
evidence in a trial for evasion. Here, of course, the taxpayer
submitted his evidence voluntarily and waived his privileges. The
law was established in U. S. v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, which has
been cited with approval in many cases including Nicola v. U. S.,
72 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 3) (1.934), to the effect that voluntary delivery of books and records or voluntary statements to a revenue
agent waive the taxpayer's immunity privileges for all time as to
all matters connected therewith or related thereto.
The second type of investigation occurs when a revenue agent,
with or without suspicion or evidence of fraud, obtains possession
of a taxpayer's books and records or secures statements by means
of coercion, a promise of immunity, or a misleading or false statement, or by stealth. In U. S. v. Abrams, 230 F. 313, a customs
officer advised Abrams that it "would be better for him if he gave
them what they wanted." The Court held that the officer's language amounted to a promise or threat and that delivery of the
papers was involuntary. The law is clear that evidence which is
obtained by any of these methods is not submitted voluntarily
and will be suppressed on motion after indictment or excluded
at trial.
Then there is the most important and controversial type of
investigation in which a revenue agent from the fraud or racket
section or the intelligence unit of the Internal Revenue Service
has information indicating evasion by the taxpayer, and calls
upon the taxpayer and requests his books and records, and interviews the taxpayer without advising the taxpayer that such evidence may be used against him in criminal proceedings. Because
such incriminating evidence is used for the purpose of convicting
a taxpayer to the same extent as a confession, it seems logical
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that the revenue agent, at the outset of the investigation, should
be required to advise the taxpayer that evidence so obtained may
be used against him in criminal proceedings. Proof of a similar
warning is required before a confession of a defendant in any
criminal trial will be admitted in evidence, and a taxpayer should
be entitled to the same warning for the same reasons.
If the effort of the agent is directed toward securing incriminating evidence from the taxpayer, why is the taxpayer not entitled to be advised that the evidence supplied by him may be used
in criminal proceedings if the contention is to be made later, as
it certainly will be, that the taxpayer waived constitutional privileges during the investigation? How does a taxpayer waive as
important a right as an immunity privilege under such circumstances without notice of the purpose of the investigation? Is the
criminal in other types of cases entitled to more in the nature of
warning than the citizen who has paid part or none of his taxes?
Are we going to withhold the warning as to a taxpayer until we
have the case completed and the warning is useless?
One of the best examples of this type of controversy is the
case of U. S. v. Guerrina,decided May 5, 1953, by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 112 F.
Supp. 126, in which Guerrina was indicted for evasion and filed
a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that papers were
obtained from him "without advice to the defendant that the information sought was in connection with the investigation of the
defendant looking toward criminal prosecution, and that he was
not warned of his constitutional right not to be a witness against
himself, and that anything he might say or any information he
might make available might be used against him in a court of
law." The evidence established that a special agent entered the
office of the defendant after the start of a so-called routine investigation and participated in the investigation thereafter, but
was not introduced, nor was the defendant advised that the purpose of this agent was to "obtain evidence of fraud for contemplated criminal proceedings." The Court, in granting the motion
to suppress, said,
To permit evidence to be obtained against a defendant by the means here employed (however innocently it
may have been done in this case) would be to encourage
overzealous and less scrupulous officers and agents of law
enforcement agencies to chip away rights, guaranteed by
the Constitution to defendants by trick and artifice, to
do what could not be done in court proceedings, i.e., compel a defendant to testify against himself.
The dividing line between proper investigation procedures and those which encroach improperly upon constitutionally guaranteed rights is shadowy and ill-defined,
but the device here used places itself clearly on the wrong
side of that line. I find that he was induced under a mis-
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apprehension of the true facts and circumstances to give
his consent to an examination under circumstances which
rendered that consent ineffective and the search unlawful.
His rights were further violated in that he was induced
by reason of the same misunderstandingof the true facts
and circumstances to give testimony against himself
without proper warning. The evidence and information
so obtained by the government may not be used against the
defendant and the motion to suppress evidence and to
return property shall be granted. (Emphasis supplied.)
The government did not appeal.
In U. S. v. Montgomery, District Court of Texas, 1954, the
defendant was acquitted in a case in which the jury was instructed
that if the defendant was led to believe that the agents were
only ascertaining his civil liability, and that there would be no
prosecution, then evidence submitted in reliance on such representations could not be considered against the defendant.
Some courts have taken testimony and have determined the
issue on a motion to suppress, but an application to suppress prior
to indictment generally is held to be premature. Other courts
have denied the motion to suppress with permission to renew at
the trial. The issue was submitted to the jury in Centracchio v.
Garrity, 198 F. (2d) 382 (1st C.) (1952), on the sole issue as to
whether the confession of Centracchio, a lawyer, was voluntary
or obtained by what the trial judge called cute tactics. The jury
acquitted the defendant-the Trial Judge Sweeney complimented
the jury-the case was affirmed on appeal, and certiorari denied.
Recently Section 1001 of the United States Code has been
used frequently by the Internal Revenue Service. This section
provides penalties for making any false statement to government
agents. Under this section it is not necessary to prove anything
except that the statement is false. An example of this occurred
where a taxpayer failed to file an income tax return for a certain
year, and when the Service checked its records and discovered
none had been filed, prosecution for failure to file was barred by
statute, but it sent two agents to call on the taxpayer with pencil
and paper. Without advising him that any statements he might
make might be used against him in criminal proceedings, they,
knowing that he had filed no return, inquired among other questions, if he had filed a return for that year and he replied that
he had done so, and his answers then and there were written
down by one of the agents. Failure to file a return had been outlawed by the Three-Year Statute, but his false statement was a
violation of Section 1001, and he thus was subject to prosecution
again in connection with a matter which until then had been
barred by the statute. This proceeding was the equivalent of a
deposition. It was the equivalent of a written confession, without
a signature, to be proved by two witnesses. If he had been subpoenaed for the purpose of taking his deposition, he would have
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been advised that his answers might be used in criminal proceedings, but he received no such advice under this procedure.
Certainly his statements to the agents under these circumstances
were not voluntary, and must be excluded at the trial-if there
should be a trial.
The case of Bram v' U. S., 168 U. S. 532, held:
that in criminal trials in the courts of the United
States wherever the question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
This case seems to apply directly to this subject. In other
words, the fact that evidence amounting to a confession is not
obtained under oath would seem not to affect the right of the
individual to rely upon his constitutional privileges. We recognize that evidence obtained by a revenue agent by coercion, fraud,
threats, or stealth is not submitted voluntarily and is equivalent
to compelling the owner to be a witness against himself and a
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
There would seem to be no distinction in principle between
such prohibited methods and an investigation by a revenue agent
from the fraud section, the racket squad, or the intelligence unit,
assigned expressly to search for evidence of fraud with special
information indicating fraud, who secures evidence from the taxpayer for use in criminal proceedings without advising the taxpayer that any evidence he may furnish may be used in criminal
proceedings against him. The submission of such evidence by a
taxpayer under such circumstances certainly is not voluntary. It
is not with knowledge of his rights, nor with knowledge that the
government proposes to contend later that by such submission
without notice of the purpose of which said evidence is submitted
that the taxpayer thereby waived immunity privileges.
Are there degrees of criminality and degrees of waiver of
immunity privileges? Shall immunity privilges be more fully protected as to known and vicious criminals than as to citizens who
have failed to pay their income taxes? Does the fact that a taxpayer is interviewed in his office or home, whereas the criminal
generally is interviewed while in custody, affect the right of the
individual to be advised of his rights before he submits any evidence or makes any statement which may amount to a confession
of guilt?
If the rights of an accused are to be zealously guarded, and if
a taxpayer may waive his immunity privileges.only by an intelligent act-that. is, with knowledge of all material- facts-why
should incriminating evidence be obtained with knowledge or suspicion of fraud without notice to the taxpayer that such evidence
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may be used against him in criminal proceedings, when the written word of the taxpayer and his books and records will convict
as readily as any defendant's signed confession? In either situation a waiver of an immunity privilege is involved, and the principle that a citizen shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself is the same in both cases.
When a taxpayer's deposition is taken under oath before a
reporter during or at the end of an investigation, the special agent
who interrogates him is required to advise him that his testimony
may be used against him in criminal proceedings in order to prove
at trial that the taxpayer testified voluntarily and render the
deposition admissible in evidence. The same rule would seem to
require the same practice when unsworn written and oral statements are sought in the home or at the office of the taxpayer for
the same purpose of incrimination, because such written and oral
statements are the equivalent of a confession for all purposes,
and likewise are intended to be used as evidence against the taxpayer in criminal proceedings.
The important factor is that our Bill of Rights contemplates
that a citizen not only shall be protected by immunity privileges,
but also that he shall have an opportunity after notice to waive or
stand on his privileges.
The rule should be that if the Service has reason to believe a
taxpayer has evaded the payment of taxes, the taxpayer should
be notified at the outset of the investigation that any evidence to
be submitted by him may be used against him in criminal proceedings in order that he may make an intelligent decision to waive
or claim immunity. If the rule is less than this, the known criminal, whose confession must be proven to have been made voluntarily
after notice of his rights before it is admitted as evidence, receives a degree of justice not extended to the individual taxpayer
under similar circumstances. The desirability of collecting revenue must not allot to the taxpayer, who generally can pay his
tax and the fifty per cent penalty and interest, a lesser degree of
immunity than is allotted to the ordinary criminal, who, after confession, generally is only an expense to maintain in a federal
institution.
In 1949 our Committee on Procedure in Fraud Cases recommended to the Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association, and the 1949 convention of the Association recommended to
the Internal Revenue Bureau that a taxpayer should be sufficiently
advised of his right to counsel at all times in the course of an
income tax investigation where fraud is suspected; but the report
of the Section to the 1950 meeting of the American Bar Association reads as follows:
The Section's second proposal received a cold reception. All present recognized that it is the uniform practice today for special agents to advise taxpayers of their
constitutional rights before taking their statements under
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oath. The Bureau. officials seem to feel, however, that a
practice of advising taxpayers of their constitutional
rights at the beginning of a special agent investigation
would unduly alarm a large proportion of those investigated whose cases are dropped after a routine check.
A man who is innocent quickly establishes his innocence. The
fear of alarming innocent taxpayers does not seem to be a valid
justification for a procedure which undoubtedly is avoiding the
use of constitutional privileges by many of our citizens.
It is to be hoped that the rules applicable to investigations
by revenue agents where fraud is known or suspected will be
clarified by the Internal Revenue Service, which, recognizing this
problem and desiring that uniform rules should govern all agents
throughout the country, I understand now is engaged in formulating a statement of principles to be followed by all revenue
agents in all income tax investigations, with specific reference
to investigations in which fraudulent practices are known or suspected. Very few cases of this type have arisen in this area, and
nothing I have said should be taken as adverse criticism of any
official of the Revenue Service nor any revenue agent in this area,
all of whom are men of the highest character and integrity, but
rules for their guidance in this connection should be adopted in
order that they may be fully advised as to the taxpayers' rights
and their own duties and obligations.
It is desirable, of course, that all United States Courts apply
the same rules to similar situations, and for this reason I direct
your attention to a statement by Chief Judge Magruder of the
First Circuit in the case of Chieftain Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209
F. (2d) 657, January 5, 1954. This case involved an application
to suppress evidence given to a revenue agent as a voluntary disclosure under the belief that immunity would follow under the
practice then in effect. An investigation had started before the
disclosure, of which the agent did not inform the taxpayer, and
the defendant was indicted on the theory that his disclosure was
too late. After directing attention to other cases involving similar
tactics, Chief Judge Magruder made the following recommendation:
It may be that, quite independent of constitutional
requirements, a rule of evidence should be formulated
for federal criminal trials to the effect that evidence obtained from the taxpayer by the method alleged should
not be admissible against him at a trial on a subsequent
indictment.
It may well be that Judge Magruder's suggestion will come
before this conference for consideration at a later date.
Perhaps it is due to the fact that taxpayers have difficulty
in sustaining the burden of proof due to their inexperience in
such matters, but the fact is that recent decisions in cases involv-
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ing attempts by taxpayers to invoke their constitutional privileges
indicate a trend away from the original concepts of the founders
of this republic. The pilgrims came to this country fresh from
the tyranny of a government of men, and set up a government of
laws with a specific Bill of Rights added to the Constitution as
an extra safeguard against tyranny and oppression by representatives of their government, because of their own personal experiences in the old country. Since the turn of this century a trend
away from the protection afforded by the Bill of Rights has become increasingly apparent. Today the problem is how far backward we shall travel toward the concept of a government of men.
Shall we jealously and zealously guard the right of the individual
to be secure in the personal privileges set up for his protection
by our Constitution and our Bill of Rights, even though some who
may be guilty may not be prosecuted, or shall we assume that
which history has proven wrong-that we may rely upon the
judgment of individuals to mete out average and impartial justice
to our citizens?
History dictates the hope that this trend will be arrested, and
that no pressure of the moment will seem to justify chipping away
or whittling away the immunity privileges founded in over a
century and a half of judicial precedent. The few taxpayers who
may escape conviction and sentence as a result of a jealous protection of their constitutional privileges still will face the severe
punishment of being required to pay the tax, the fifty per cent
penalty and interest, which generally reduces the taxpayer's net
worth to nil and forces him into a fresh start on the road to financial independence. Whether we preserve or whether we continue
to whittle and chip away the constitutional privileges of the individual will be determined, whether we realize it or not, in the
realm of philosophy of government and not in the realm of constitutional or statutory construction.

ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an invaluable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
This order slip may be returned with the appropriate data.
We sincerely solicit your support.
Thank you,
Dwight A. Hamilton, Managing Editor.
Enclosed please find two dollars ($2.00) for my copy of the
30 YEAR DICTA INDEX ] Will remit upon receipt of Index ]
Name
Address
Please make check payable to the University of Denver

